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Abstract
According to influential accounts of scientific method, e.g., criti-
cal rationalism, scientific knowledge grows by repeatedly testing our
best hypotheses. In comparison to rivaling accounts of scientific rea-
soning such as Bayesianism, these accounts are closer to crucial as-
pects of scientific practice. But despite the preeminence of hypoth-
esis tests in statistical inference, their philosophical foundations are
shaky. In particular, the interpretation of “insignificant results”—
outcomes where the tested hypothesis has survived the test—poses
a major epistemic challenge that is not sufficiently addressed by the
standard methodology for conducting such tests.
In this paper, I argue that a quantitative explication of degree of
corroboration can fill this important methodological and epistemolog-
ical gap. First, I argue that this concept is distinct from the Bayesian
notion of evidential support and that it plays an independent role
in scientific reasoning. Second, I demonstrate that degree of cor-
roboration cannot be suitably explicated in a probabilistic relevance
framework, as proposed by Popper (1954, 1934/2002). Third, I derive
two measures of corroboration that possess a large number of attrac-
tive properties, establish an insightful relation between corroboration
and evidential support and are not committed to a Bayesian or a fre-
quentist framework. In sum, the paper rethinks the foundations of
inductive inference by providing a novel logic of hypothesis testing.
2
1 Introduction. Motivating the concept of corrobora-
tion
The idea of acquiring scientific knowledge by testing hypotheses and ap-
praising how well they have stood up to the test is as old as the scientific
revolution. For critical rationalists such as Karl R. Popper (1934/2002),
the critical attitude that we express by repeatedly testing our best scien-
tific theories even constitutes the basis of rational inquiry about the world.
However, only in the middle of the 20th century, the design and interpreta-
tion of statistical hypothesis tests has been formalized. In effect, they have
acquired a predominant role in scientific reasoning and are a crucial part
of publication standards. The most frequent form of scientific inference
is the null hypothesis significance test (NHST): it tests a precise hypothesis
h0—the “null” or default hypothesis—against an unspecific alternative h1.
In its most simple form, the null hypothesis posits a precise value for a
real-valued parameter θ (h0 : θ = θ0), while the alternative (h1 : θ 6= θ0)
is a disjunction of uncountably many precise hypotheses. Such tests are
useful for finding out whether there is a non-negligible difference between
two different experimental conditions, e.g., a medical drug and a placebo
treatment.
The outcomes of NHST are traditionally described either as the “accep-
tance” or the “rejection” of the null hypothesis. If the results are very un-
likely under the null, it is rejected in favor of the alternative (e.g., Neyman
and Pearson 1933; Fisher 1956; Gillies 1971). While a rejection is usually
taken as evidence against the null hypothesis and quantified by means of
a p-value or significance level, there is little methodological guidance on
what the acceptance of the null hypothesis could mean, in a positive sense.
Statistics textbooks (e.g., Chase and Brown 2000; Wasserman 2004) restrict
themselves to the claim that an acceptance of the null hypothesis does
not mean more than failure to reject the null, or failure to demonstrate a
statistically significant phenomenon. This is remarkable for at least two
reasons: statistically insignificant results can hide substantial effects (Zil-
iak and McCloskey 2008), and also the absence of significant results can be
a scientifically interesting conclusion. As an example, consider the mon-
itoring of a freshly admitted medical drug for harmful side effects. The
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producer of the drug, clinicians and the general public all have an inter-
est in knowing to which degree the null hypothesis—that the drug has
no unexpected side effects—is backed by the evidence, but the standard
methodology for hypothesis testing does not specify how we should quan-
tify such a judgment, let alone how we should do it in an objective way.
A concept that could fill this lacuna in the NHST methodology is degree
of corroboration, famously developed by Karl R. Popper in his “Logic of
Scientific Discovery” (1934/2002: ch. 10):
By the degree of corroboration of a theory I mean a concise
report evaluating the state (at a certain time t) of the critical
discussion of a theory, with respect to the way it solves its
problems; its degree of testability; the severity of tests it has
undergone; and the way it has stood up to these tests. Cor-
roboration (or degree of corroboration) is thus an evaluating
report of past performance. Like preference, it is essentially com-
parative. (Popper 1979: 18, original emphasis. See also Popper
1934/2002: 248.)
Adequately explicated corroboration judgments would solve many
problems: they would appraise the performance of the null hypothesis
in an experiment, rather than just stating the failure to find significant re-
sults. They would indicate when the “acceptance” of the null hypothesis
provides a reason to trust it. They would explain why highly corroborated
hypotheses are preferred to weakly corroborated ones. More generally,
explicating degree of corroboration might revive a critical rationalist epis-
temology of science, by showing how hypothesis tests increase scientific
knowledge (e.g., Rowbottom 2011). In the light of these promises, it is
notable that neither philosophers nor statisticians have found an adequate
explication of degree of corroboration, and that efforts to do so have faded
since the 1960s (Popper 1954; Good 1960, 1968).
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 conceptually demarcates
degree of corroboration from Bayesian explications of evidential support.
Section 3 discusses, and ultimately rejects, Popper’s own explication of
corroboration. Section 4 advances a formal argument to the effect that a
probabilistic relevance framework is not suited for explicating corrobora-
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tion. Section 5 introduces the new framework for measuring corrobora-
tion and derives two measures of corroboration from a parsimonious set
of plausible axioms. Finally, Section 6 explains the attractive properties
of this measure and relates it to the concept of evidential support while
Section 7 summarizes and concludes. While my own definition of de-
gree of corroboration in Sections 5-6 is definitely inspired by Popper, the
approach of the paper is systematic, not exegetical, and the proposed ex-
plication will in some ways deviate from Popper’s own take on scientific
reasoning.
2 Evidential support versus corroboration
The point of measuring corroboration is to quantify the extent to which
a hypothesis has stood up to an attempt to refute it. Thus, degree of
corroboration gives an evaluating—and supposedly objective—report of
past performance. For the case of a hypothesis that makes deterministic
predictions, corroborating evidence is intuitively defined as evidence that
conforms to the predictions of the tested hypothesis. The more specific it
is, the more it corroborates the hypothesis.
This rationale essentially corresponds to the hypothetico-deductive
model of theory confirmation (Gemes 1998): logical consequences of a the-
ory confirm it. While this model may be adequate as a qualitative theory
of corroboration, it is not applicable to NHSTs which deal with statistical
predictions of a hypothesis. Here, a different, quantitative model has to
be developed (see also Popper 1934/2002: 265–266).
However, it is not evident that we need corroboration judgments for
explicating this aspect of NHSTs. There is already a concept that describes
how the epistemic status of a hypothesis is raised by observations: eviden-
tial support. Standardly, evidential support is explicated in Bayesian terms,
that is, in terms of degrees of belief: evidence e supports hypothesis h if
and only if p(h|e) > p(h), that is, if e increases the agent’s subjective de-
gree of belief in h (e.g., Fitelson 2001). Why do we need another, closely
related concept?
This skepticism is expressed in the Monism Thesis: the concept of cor-
roboration can be reduced to the (Bayesian) concept of evidential support.
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This thesis sounds especially attractive in the light of the shaky epistemic
foundations of NHST and their frequent misuse (e.g., Cohen 1994; Fidler
2013): perhaps we should abandon the entire business of (frequentist) hy-
pothesis testing, perform a Bayesian analysis based on the interpretation
of probability as subjective degree of belief and replace a judgment of cor-
roboration by a judgment of evidential support. For Bayesians such as
Howson and Urbach (2006), this could be the preferred option.
I shall now present four objections to the Monism thesis. This does not
rule out that a proper explication of corroboration can also be interpreted
as a measure of evidential support, or vice versa: rather, the point is to
show that the two concepts are not redundant and need different explica-
tion strategies.
Objection 1: Inference to the true hypothesis is the target notion
of evidential support, but not necessarily of corroboration.
Scientific hypotheses and models are idealizations of the external
world that are judged by their ability to capture relevant causal relations
and to predict future events, rather than literally true descriptions of the
external world (see the survey of Frigg and Hartmann 2006). In other
words, the epistemic function of corroboration consists in determining
whether the data are consistent with the tested hypothesis, or whether
the results agree “well enough” with the null hypothesis h0 that we may
use it as a proxy for a more general statistical model. In other words, the
“acceptance” of h0 does not imply that it should be regarded as true or
empirically adequate, but that it is a useful and tractable idealization of a
more general statistical model (Bernardo 2012; Gelman and Shalizi 2013).
That is, corroboration is a guide to practical preference over competing
hypothesis, but not as a guide to truth (Popper 1934/2002: 281–282). Evi-
dential support, on the other hand, is traditionally defined as the degree to
which our confidence in the truth of a hypothesis is raised. Convergence
theorems show how inference to the best-supported hypothesis guides us
to the true hypothesis (e.g., Gaifman and Snir 1982; see Brössel 2014 for a
similar result regarding the systematic power of a theory). Unlike corrob-
oration, which is defined as an evaluating report on past data, evidential
support is supposed to justify inductive inference.
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Objection 2: (Change in) Degree of belief is a central concept
for evidential support, but not for corroboration.
Evidential support is based on comparing past and present degrees of
belief. This can be traced easily in the qualitative definition of evidential
support (e supports h if and only if p(h|e) > p(h)), but also in popular
support measures such d(h, e) = p(h|e)− p(h) and r(h, e) = p(h|e)/p(h).
More generally, Crupi, Chater and Tentori (2013) have argued that all mea-
sures of evidential support c(h, e) should possess the “final probability
incrementality” property
c(h, e) >/=/< c(h, e′) if and only if p(h|e) >/=/< p(h|e′). (1)
This condition demands that e supports h more than e′ if and only if e
raises the probability of h to a higher level than e′ does. This condition
makes sense for a concept of evidential support that is specified as a gen-
eralization of strict deductive entailment, or as the degree to which e raises
the agent’s degree of belief in h (Eells and Fitelson 2002; Crupi, Tentori and
González 2007). However, it is much less obvious for degree of corrobora-
tion: a corroboration judgment seems, at least in principle, to make sense
even if we do not have subjective degrees of belief in the tested hypothesis
or refuse to elicit them. It is about past performance, not about epistemic
or psychological attitude. In a nutshell, rather than a (subjective) measure
of belief change, corroboration ought to be an (objective) measure of past
performance.
Objection 3: On a Bayesian account, hypotheses with prior
probability p(h) = 0 cannot be confirmed evidentially. Yet,
they are perfectly acceptable candidates for being corroborated.
As a consequence of Bayes’ Theorem, any hypothesis with prior proba-
bility p(h) = 0 also has posterior probability p(h|e) = p(h) p(e|h)/p(e) =
0. By the qualitative definition of evidential support, no such hypothe-
sis can be evidentially supported since p(h|e) = p(h). But certainly, they
can be corroborated: after all, scientists often deal with an uncountable
set of candidate hypotheses where all singleton hypotheses receive zero
weight (e.g., different values of a physical parameter). Testing whether
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such hypotheses are good and useful idealizations of reality, or quantify-
ing the empirical corroboration of any such hypothesis certainly makes
sense. This objection is especially troubling since Bayesian models of
NHSTs often assign zero weight to the null hypothesis, e.g., by assign-
ing a continuous prior over the parameter space. Whatever the measure of
evidence that the Bayesian uses for appraising the null in such tests (e.g.,
a density-based measure such as the Bayes factor), it cannot be a Bayesian
measure of evidential support in the proper sense.
Objection 4: Corroboration is a way more asymmetric notion
than evidential support.
The logic of NHSTs is asymmetric: in general, a rejection of the tested
hypothesis h gives rise to much stronger conclusions than an acceptance
would do. A reason for this is that unlike the null, the alternative ¬h
is usually not a precise hypothesis, like in our introductory example of
testing θ = θ0 against θ 6= θ0.
It is not obvious how this asymmetry can be expressed by measures
of evidential support. Consider two of the most reputable ones, the log-
likelihood-measure l (Kemeny and Oppenheim 1952; Fitelson 2001; Bovens
and Hartmann 2003), and the Crupi-Tentori-measure z (Crupi, Tentori and
Gonzalez 2007; Crupi and Tentori 2013):
l(h, e) = log
p(e|h)
p(e|¬h) z(h, e) =

p(h|e)−p(h)
1−p(h) if p(h|e) ≥ p(h)
p(h|e)−p(h)
p(h) if p(h|e) < p(h)
According to both measures, ¬h is supported by e to the same degree that
h is undermined by e:
−l(h, e) = l(¬h, e) −z(h, e) = z(¬h, e)
Such symmetry properties are sensible adequacy conditions for measures
of evidential support (Eells and Fitelson 2002; Crupi, Tentori and González
2007), but they are at odds with the asymmetric roles of hypotheses in
NHST and unattractive for degree of corroboration. There, it is not even
clear what it could mean that ¬h is corroborated.
These objections undermine the Monism Thesis sufficiently to motivate
an explication of degree of corroboration on independent grounds. That
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is, we will set up adequacy conditions on a measure of corroboration that
differ from the standard adequacy conditions on evidential support (see
Crupi 2014; Crupi and Tentori 2014). This does not rule out that a support
measure may perform a double duty as an adequate measure of corrobo-
ration: it just means that both concepts are explicated independently. On
the basis of our proposed explication, we re-investigate the relationship
between corroboration and evidential support (Section 6). We begin by
discussing Popper’s classical proposal for a measure of corroboration.
3 Popper’s measure of degree of corroboration
Popper’s first writings on degree of corroboration, that is, chapter 10 of
the “Logic of Scientific Discovery”, do not engage in a quantitative expli-
cation. Apparently, this task is deferred to a scientist’s common sense.
However, this move makes the entire concept of corroboration vulnerable
to the charge of subjectivism: without a quantitative criterion, it is not clear
which corroboration judgments are sound and which aren’t (Good 1968:
136). Especially if we aim at gaining objective knowledge from hypothesis
tests, we need a precise explication of degree of corroboration.
Popper faces this challenge in a couple of BJPS articles (Popper 1954,
1957, 1958) that form, together with a short introduction, appendix ix) of
his “Logic of Scientific Discovery”. In these articles, Popper develops and
defends a measure of degree of corroboration. Popper argues that this
measure cannot be a probability in the sense of Carnap (1950), that is, it is
no measure of the plausibility of the tested hypothesis conditional on the
observed evidence. In Popper’s view, even an unlikely hypothesis can be
highly corroborated if it is sufficiently informative and well-supported by
the evidence.
To characterize appropriate corroboration measures Popper comes up
with a list of desiderata reproduced below. Their rationale is twofold:
first, corroboration increases with the mutual relevance of e and h, second,
informative hypotheses are preferred over uninformative ones.
Regarding the formal nature of the desiderata, we assume that e and h
are among the closed sentences L of a language L. A corroboration mea-
sure is described by a function L2 ×P → R, where P is the set of proba-
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bility measures on the σ-algebra generated by L. This function assigns a
real-valued degree of corroboration to any pair of sentences together with
a probability (degree of belief) function. For the sake of simplicity, we
will omit explicit reference to background knowledge and assume that it
is implicit in the probability function p(·).
I c(h, e) >/=/< 0 if and only if p(e|h) >/=/< p(e).
This is a classical positive probabilistic relevance condition: e corroborates h
just in case h makes e more expected. Vice versa, if h makes e less ex-
pected, the degree of corroboration is negative. This condition is also in
line with Popper’s remark (1979: 18) that corroboration is, like preference,
essentially contrastive.
II −1 = c(h,¬h) ≤ c(h, e) ≤ c(h, h) ≤ 1.
III c(h, h) = 1− p(h).
IV If e |= h then c(h, e) = 1− p(h).
V If e |= ¬h then c(h, e) = −1.
These conditions determine under which conditions the measure of cor-
roboration takes its extremal values. Minimal degree of corroboration is
obtained if the evidence refutes the hypothesis (V). Conversely, the most
corroborating piece of evidence e is the one that verifies h. In this case, de-
gree of corroboration is equal to the improbability of h (II, III, IV), which is
supposed to express the informativity, testability and empirical content of
h (Popper 1934/2002: 268–269; see also Popper 1963: 385–387; Rowbottom
2013: 742–744). This is motivated as follows:
Science does not aim, primarily, at high probabilities. It aims
at a high informative content, well backed by experience. But
a hypothesis may be very probable simply because it tells us
nothing, or little. (Popper 1934/2002: 416)
Assigning a corroboration bonus to highly informative and testable hy-
potheses fits, of course, into a critical rationalist picture about aims and
method of science. The probability p(h) is interpreted in Carnap’s (1950)
logical sense—a point that need not worry us now, but to which we return
later.
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VI c(h, e) ≥ 0 increases with the power of h to explain e.
VII If p(h) = p(h′), then c(h, e) > c(h′, e′) if and only if p(h|e) > p(h′|e′).
These conditions reiterate the positive relevance rationale from condition
I, and make it more precise. Regarding condition VI, Popper (2002: 416)
defines explanatory power according to the formula E(e, h) = (p(e|h) −
p(e))/(p(e|h) + p(e)), another measure of the positive relevance between
e and h. Condition VII states that corroboration essentially co-varies with
posterior probability whenever the prior probabilities are equal.
VIII If h |= e, then
a) c(h, e) ≥ 0;
b) c(h, e) is an increasing function of 1− p(e);
c) c(h, e) is an increasing function of p(h).
IX If ¬h is consistent and ¬h |= e, then
a) c(h, e) ≤ 0;
b) c(h, e) is an increasing function of p(e);
c) c(h, e) is an increasing function of p(h).
Condition VIII demands that corroboration gained from a successful de-
ductive prediction co-vary with the informativity of the evidence and the
prior probability of the hypothesis. The latter requirement stands in a
certain tension with conditions III and IV, which emphasize the inverse
relationship between prior probability and degree of corroboration. Con-
dition IX mirrors condition VIII for the negative case.
These desiderata pull into different directions. Some of them are mo-
tivated by considerations of positive relevance and evidential support (I,
II, VI, VII, VIIIb), others assign a bonus to the informativity, content or
improbability of h (III, IV). In particular, degree of corroboration is maxi-
mal if and only if (!) a hypothesis with probability zero is entailed by the
evidence. That is, Popper’s desiderata reconcile two essential criteria for
theory acceptance (Hempel 1960; Huber 2008; Brössel 2013): the support
in favor of h, and the logical strength, informativity and empirical content
of h.
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Popper then develops a corroboration measure that satisfies all these
desiderata, namely:
cP(h, e) =
p(e|h)− p(e)
p(e|h)− p(eh) + p(e) (2)
Before I explain my own take on Popper’s proposal, I would like to exam-
ine several objections made in the literature.
Rowbottom (2013) objects to Popper that if he were consistent with his
claim made elsewhere that universal generalizations always have prob-
ability zero, he should restrict his measure to that case, because these
hypotheses are also the most important ones in science. Then, cP can be
written as
c′P(h, e) =
p(e|h)− p(e|¬h)
p(e|h) + p(e|¬h) (3)
which is ordinally equivalent to the log-likelihood measure l of evidential
support. Rowbottom continues as follows:
Compare two scenarios in which e is found to be true, the first
in which p(e|h) = 1 and p(e) = 0.1, and the second in which
p(e′|h) = 0.1 and p(e′) = 0.01. According to (3), h is equally
corroborated, i.e. has a corroboration value of 9/11, in each
scenario. This is patently absurd, however, since in the former
scenario e is entailed by h [...] (and discovery of ¬e would have
falsified the conjunct), whereas in the latter scenario h makes
no notable contribution to predicting e [...] (and discovery of ¬e
would hardly have been a blow for h [...]). (Rowbottom 2013:
740)
Rowbottom then concludes that c′P(h, e) is not suitable as a measure of
corroboration. Corroboration should be sensitive to the fact that if p(e|h)
were very high, an observation of ¬e would virtually falsify h. When e is
observed, h has survived a severe refutation attempt and should count as
better corroborated than if e′ had been observed. c′P(h, e) fails to rescue
this intuition.
A natural reply is that the severity of a test is a methodological virtue,
but irrelevant for the evidential interpretation of the results (Sprenger 2009).
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Hence, it should not affect degree of corroboration. Moreover, in contin-
uous or large discrete sample spaces, every piece of evidence e typically
has a very low probability of being observed; often it is zero. What makes
e corroborating evidence for h is not so much the high value of p(e|h), but
the fact that the probability of e (respectively the value of the density func-
tion) is much higher than for competing hypotheses. This is, after all, the
rationale behind statistical hypotheses tests that typically deal with con-
tinuous sample spaces. Hacking (1965), Spielman (1974) and Royall (1997)
have, among others, advanced forceful arguments that any statistical hy-
pothesis test must make reference to explicit or implicit alternatives (see
also Sprenger 2014). Popper could refer to these arguments in order to
deflect Rowbottom’s criticism.
A second criticism, observed by Díez (2011: 196), is based on the ob-
servation that by VII, e corroborates h more than e′ if and only if it raises
the probability of h to a higher value than e′ does (c(h, e) > c(h, e′) iff
p(h|e) > p(h|e′)). According to Díez, the co-variation of posterior proba-
bility and corroboration clashes with Popper’s dismissal of posterior prob-
ability as a criterion for theory choice: “this rule is equivalent to the fol-
lowing rule: choose always the hypothesis which has the highest degree
of ad hoc character” (Popper 1963: 385). However, condition VII only states
which of two pieces of evidence confirms a peculiar theory to a higher de-
gree. In other words, it is restricted to theories with the same informative
content. Therefore, the “ad hoc” criticism does not apply in this case.
Third, Díez objects that neither h |= e, nor e |= h, nor h ≡ e is a suffi-
cient condition for maximal corroboration. Some of these conditions (e.g.,
h ≡ e) are indeed compelling sufficient conditions for maximal eviden-
tial support (see Crupi 2014). However, the relevance of e for h is not the
only factor that affects degree of corroboration: also the informativity of h
determines its corroborability (see condition IV). From Popper’s point of
view, it does make sense that c(h, h) > c(h′, h′) if and only if h has more
empirical content than h′.
In my view, a fourth criticism poses bigger problems for Popper By
VIIIc, degree of corroboration co-varies with the prior probability of h
whenever h entails e. That is, if h and h′ successfully predict e (h |= e and
h′ |= e), then the corroboration ranking tracks the prior probability of h
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and h′. This runs contrary to Popper’s intentions about the significance
of empirical content/testability as a contributing factor to degree of cor-
roboration. Since deductive entailment between theory and evidence is a
classical case of prediction in science and a showcase for critical rationalist
reasoning, this result is especially worrisome.
Fifth and last, there is an inconsistency in Popper’s suggestions for
interpreting the probabilities in cP. Since he is opposed to any subjec-
tive interpretation, he proposes a frequentist interpretation for the likeli-
hood p(e|h) and the marginal likelihood p(e), and a logical interpretation
for the probability of the hypothesis p(h), which is required to calculate
p(eh) = p(e|h)p(h). These moves are quite ad hoc, and Popper does not
specify a bridge principle for combining these different types of proba-
bilities. Moreover, determining the relative frequency of e or the logical
probability of h is a hard problem for which Popper provides little guid-
ance. Of course, we could just interpret all probabilities in a subjective
way, but this move would not suit Popper’s general philosophical frame-
work (Popper 1934/2002, ch. 8). It would also require an additional and
far from obvious argument that a subjective interpretation does not com-
promise the alleged objectivity of a measure of corroboration.
Summing up, Popper’s measure cP suffers from severe formal and con-
ceptual shortcomings. The crucial question is now: which conclusions do
we draw from Popper’s failure to adequately explicate degree of corrob-
oration? Should we just come up with a different probabilistic relevance
measure? Or change the framework altogether?
4 Corroboration and positive relevance
This section shows two impossibility results for corroboration measures
that (i) are built on the notion of positive probabilistic relevance between
e and h, that is, e corroborates h whenever p(e|h) > p(e); (ii) preserve
Popper’s intuition that corroboration should in general not co-vary with
prior probability; (iii) satisfy some weak and plausible constraints.
The first condition is mainly formal in nature (cf. Schupbach and
Sprenger 2011; Crupi 2014):
Formality There exists a function f : [0, 1]3 → R such that for all e, h ∈ L
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and p(·) ∈ P,
c(h, e) = f (p(e|h), p(e), p(h)).
This condition states that degree of corroboration depends on the joint
probability distribution of e and h, since the three arguments of f are
sufficient to determine the entire distribution, degenerate cases left aside.
In order to keep the playing field level, we have focused on the same
quantities that figure in Popper’s measure of corroboration.
Now we state the first substantial condition:
Weak Law of Likelihood (WLL) For mutually exclusive hypotheses
h1, h2 ∈ L, e ∈ L and p(·) ∈ P, if
p(e|h1) ≥ p(e|h2) p(¬e|¬h1) ≥ p(¬e|¬h2) (4)
with one inequality being strict, then c(h1, e) > c(h2, e).
The WLL has been defended as capturing a “core message of Bayes’ The-
orem” (Joyce 2008) and as a non-negotiable adequacy condition on mea-
sures of evidential support (e.g., Brössel 2013). If h1 predicts e better than
h2, and ¬h1 predicts ¬e better than ¬h2 does, then h1 performs better than
h2. Since this reasoning only applies to the predictive performance of the
competing hypotheses, it is even more compelling for corroboration than
for evidential support. The version given here is in one sense weaker and
in one sense stronger than Joyce’s original formulation: it is stronger be-
cause only one inequality has to be strict (see also Brössel 2013: 395–396);
it is weaker because the WLL has been restricted to mutually exclusive
hypotheses, where our intuitions are more reliable.
Another condition deals with irrelevant evidence:
Screened-Off Evidence Let e1, e2, h ∈ L and p ∈ P. If e2 is probabilisti-
cally independent of e1, h, and e1 ∧ h, then c(h, e1) = c(h, e1 ∧ e2).
This condition prominently figures in several explications of evidential
support and explanatory power (e.g., Kemeny and Oppenheim 1952;
Schupbach and Sprenger 2011). But it is also very sensible with respect
to degree of corroboration. Extra evidence which is irrelevant in any re-
spect (e2 ⊥ e1, h, e1 ∧ h) should not change the evaluation of an experiment
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where h has been tested and evidence e1 has been observed. Imagine, for
example, that a scientist tests the hypothesis that a high pitch facilitates
voice recognition. As the scientists’s university is interested in improv-
ing the planning of lab experiments, she also collects data on the times
when participants drop in, which slots are busy, which ones are quiet, etc.
Plausibly, these data satisfy the independence conditions of Screened-Off
Evidence, and equally plausibly, they do not influence its degree of cor-
roboration.
The next adequacy condition is motivated by the problem of irrelevant
conjunctions, a well-known challenge for Bayesian measures of evidential
support (e.g., Fitelson 2002; Hawthorne and Fitelson 2004). Assume that a
hypothesis h, such as General Theory of Relativity (GTR), logically implies
a phenomenon e, such as the perihelion shift of Mercury. This observation
corroborates GTR: logical implication is a special case of probabilistic rel-
evance.
However, once we add an utterly irrelevant proposition h′ = “the
chicken came before the egg” to the hypothesis, it seems that e corrob-
orates h∧ h′—the conjunction of GTR and the chicken-egg hypothesis—not
more than h (if at all). After all, h′ was not tested by the observations we
made. It has no record of past performance to which it could appeal. This
motivates the following constraint:
Irrelevant Conjunctions Assume the following conditions on h, h′, e ∈ L
and p ∈ P are satisfied:
(1) h and h′ are consistent and p(h ∧ h′) < p(h);
(2) p(e) ∈ (0, 1);
(3) h |= e;
(4) p(e|h′) = p(e).
Then it is always the case that c(h ∧ h′, e) ≤ c(h, e).
This requirement states that for any non-trivial hypothesis h′ that is con-
sistent with h and irrelevant for e ((1), (4)), h ∧ h′ is no corroborated more
than h whenever h non-trivially entails e ((2), (3)). Indeed, it would be
strange if corroboration could be increased “for free” by attaching irrele-
vant propositions. Plausibly, this requirement could be strengthened to a
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strict inequality, but for our purposes, the weaker formulation is sufficient,
and in this version, it is also weaker than Popper’s VIIIc.
Finally, we want to account for the intuition that highly corroborated
hypotheses are informative propositions backed by the evidence (see Pop-
per’s conditions II-IV). Unlike evidential support, corroboration contains
an element of severe testing: the hypothesis should run a risk of being
falsified, and high informativity and empirical content contribute to this
goal. This motivates the following desiderata, one of them being slightly
weaker than the other:
Strong Informativity The informativity/empirical content of a proposi-
tion can increase degree of corroboration, ceteris paribus. That is,
there are h, h′, e, e′ ∈ L and p ∈ P with p(e|h) > p(e), p(e′|h′) > p(e′)
such that
(1) p(e|h) = p(e′|h′), p(e) = p(e′);
(2) 1/2 ≥ p(h) > p(h′);
(3) c(h, e) > c(h′, e′).
Weak Informativity Degree of corroboration c(h, e) does not generally co-
vary with the prior probability of h. That is, there are h, h′, e, e′ ∈ L
and p ∈ P with p(e|h) > p(e), p(e′|h′) > p(e′) such that
(1) p(e|h) = p(e′|h′), p(e) = p(e′);
(2) 1/2 ≥ p(h) > p(h′);
(3) c(h, e) ≥ c(h′, e′).
The intuition behind Weak Informativity can also be expressed as fol-
lows: corroboration does not, in the first place, assess the prior plausibil-
ity of a hypothesis; therefore c(h, e) should not in general co-vary with the
prior plausibility of h. To this, Strong Informativity adds that low prior
probability/high empirical content can even be corroboration-conducive.
Note that the requirement 1/2 ≥ p(h), p(h′) is purely technical and philo-
sophically innocuous.
At this point, it is possible to demonstrate that the listed conditions
are incompatible with each other. First, a consequence of Weak Law of
Likelihood is that corroboration is an increasing function of the prior
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probability of a hypothesis, which clashes directly with Strong/Weak
Informativity:
Theorem 1 No measure of corroboration c(h, e) constructed according to
Formality can satisfy Weak Law of Likelihood and Weak/Strong
Informativity at the same time.
Second, and perhaps more surprisingly, Strong Informativity clashes
with Irrelevant Conjunctions and Screened-Off Evidence:
Theorem 2 No measure of corroboration c(h, e) constructed accord-
ing to Formality can satisfy Screened-Off Evidence, Irrelevant
Conjunctions and Strong Informativity at the same time.
Thus, the intuition behind Strong/Weak Informativity cannot be sat-
isfied if other plausible adequacy constraints on degree of corroboration
are accepted. All proofs are given in the appendix. Notably, the result
of Theorem 2 can be extended to Weak Informativity if we make the as-
sumption that irrelevant conjunctions dilute the degree of corroboration,
rather than not increasing it. Of course, all this does not show that ex-
plicating degree of corroboration is a futile project. Rather, it reveals a
fundamental and probably insoluble tension between the two main con-
tributing factors of corroboration that Popper identifies (see the quote on
p. 10): probabilistic relevance and empirical content.
The two theorems suggest two interpretations: (i) either we cannot ad-
equately explicate corroboration in a probabilistic relevance framework, or
(ii) the entire concept of corroboration is overloaded with intuitions point-
ing into different directions. However, the problem does not seem to lie
with the adequacy conditions. Screened-Off Evidence is highly plausible
for both corroboration and evidential support. Law of Likelihood and
Irrelevant Conjunctions are complementary; yet both of them lead to
impossibility results. Finally, if we give up Strong/Weak Informativity,
we lose a crucial characteristic of corroboration in hypothesis testing,
namely that it applies in particular to precise and informative hypothe-
ses.
This diagnosis points us to re-thinking the entire conceptual frame-
work, as expressed in Formality. Perhaps it is neither necessary nor suffi-
cient to base a corroboration judgment on the joint probability distribution
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of h and e? If we explicate corroboration in terms of probabilistic relevance,
judgments of corroboration compare the merits of h with the merits of ¬h,
defined as the aggregate of alternatives to h. However, a comparison to
such an aggregate does not make much sense in many contexts of statisti-
cal hypothesis testing where we deal with a multitude of distinct alterna-
tives hi, i ∈ N. To calculate p(e|¬h) = ∑i p(e|hi), we would have to know
the prior probabilities p(hi), an assignment that many scientists refuse to
make in practice. This framework also fails at describing how hypotheses
with probability zero can be corroborated, one of the central distinctions
between evidential support and degree of corroboration.
The formal results of this section can then be regarded as formal vindi-
cations of the arguments advanced against the Monism Thesis in Section
2. They show that we cannot jointly satisfy a set of reasonable desiderata
about degree of corroboration in a probabilistic relevance framework. All
this suggests that we should develop explications of degree of corrobora-
tion in a different conceptual framework.
5 A new framework for measuring corroboration
One of the main objections to probabilistic relevance explications of cor-
roboration consists in the way the alternative hypothesis is treated. In
NHST, it is common that the null is a precise hypothesis h0 : θ = θ0 which
is tested against a composite hypothesis h1 : θ 6= θ0. Such composite
hypotheses are rather an umbrella for distinct alternatives than a proba-
bilistic aggregate of alternatives, but in evaluations in terms of evidential
support, they are treated as a single hypothesis, namely the negation of
h0. In practice, however, we want to simulteanously test the null against a set
of distinct alternatives, not to test it against a single, aggregate hypothesis.
That is, degree of corroboration should be sensitive to the fine-structure of
the alternatives.
A simple example may illustrate this thesis. Suppose one wants to infer
the mean value θ of a Normal distribution, where the null hypothesis h0 :
X ∼ N(0, 1) is tested against the alternatives h1 : X ∼ N(2, 1) and h2 : X ∼
N(−2, 1). Then, some observations (e.g., x ≈ 2) will be well explained by
h1 and be poorly explained by h2, while other observations (e.g., x ≈ −2)
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Figure 1: Testing the null hypothesis h0 : X ∼ N(0, 1) (full line) against the
aggregate of h1 : X ∼ N(2, 1) and h2 : X ∼ N(−2, 1) (dashed line). The
dotted lines represent h1 and h2 themselves.
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will be well explained by h2 and be poorly explained by h1. This tension
gets lost when we only consider the aggregate of h1 and h2, which is a
bimodal distribution with peaks at -2 and 2: both observations (x ≈ −2
and x ≈ 2) are well explained by the aggregate alternative hypothesis
and favor it over the null. Thus, this testing problem is conceptually and
mathematically quite different from the original one against two distinct
hypotheses. See Figure 1 for a graphical illustration.
The rest of the section develops two measures of degree of corrobo-
ration that are sensitive to the partition of alternative hypotheses H =
{h0, h1, h2, ...}. They summarize judgments of evidential favoring into a
single number that expresses the performance of the null hypothesis h0
in a test with evidence e. The explications focus on the evidential aspect
of corroboration and leave out some methodological virtues, such as the
severity of the test or issues pertaining to experimental design. This is in
line with Popper’s own remarks that such virtues cannot be fully formal-
ized (Popper 1956/83: 154). From now on it will be assumed that the data
have been collected in genuine tests of h0.
A first measure of corroboration is derived from three adequacy criteria
CA1-CA3 motivated below.
The first requirement is based on a thought from Section 2: degree
of corroboration indicates whether h0 is a suitable proxy for a more gen-
eral model. In other words, if a hypothesis h0 is highly corroborated, the
loss in accuracy that we suffer by replacing the general model H by h0 is
reasonably small. For example, assume the null states that manipulating
some independent variables has no effect on the data. In practice, there
will always be some small effect, but we want to know whether it is neg-
ligibly small. This would be the practical significance of an “inference to
the null hypothesis”. This question is highly relevant to scientific practice,
and it is the one that we may reasonably regard as the motivation behind
the entire null hypothesis testing business. Therefore we demand
CA1 Corroboration should quantify the average score gain of replacing the
general model H with the null hypothesis h0. That is, for a suitable
scoring rule S(h0, e), the degree of corroboration that e provides for
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h0 relative to H can be defined as
cH(h0, e) = ∑
hi∈H
ωi · (S(h0, e)− S(hi, e)) (5)
where ωi denotes the relative weight that each element ofH receives.
That is, degree of corroboration sums up the score differences between
h0 and the alternatives hi, weighted by ωi. Note that the ωi need not be
interpreted as degrees of belief that a particular hypothesis is true or em-
pirically adequate. Scientists do not always entertain such degrees of belief
in the hypotheses they investigate. They rather regard them as useful ide-
alizations (see also the discussion in Section 2). For example, in the assess-
ment of global climate models, most physical scientists are convinced that
none of the considered models is true or empirically adequate, and they
use a broad set scientific values for weighting these models (e.g., Frame et
al. 2007). Hence, the ωi are supposed to reflect the relative standing of the
alternatives in the scientific community, including cognitive values such
as fruitfulness, scope, etc. In other words, the above definition is neutral
with respect to the Bayesian/frequentist divide in statistical inference. To
repeat, the main move of CA1 is to replace a vague explicandum—degree
of corroboration—by a precise and fruitful explicatum, namely average
gain in predictive power by accepting the null hypothesis.
The next step is to find a suitable scoring rule S(h0, e). For this, we
impose two more adequacy criteria:
CA2 There exists a real-valued, continuous function f : [0, 1] → R such
that S(h0, e) := f (p(e|h0)). In other words, the score of h0 on evi-
dence e only depends on the probability of e under h0.
CA3 The scoring rule S(h0, e) is additive with regard to evidence that is
independent under h0. In other words, if e ⊥ e′|h0, then
S(h0, e ∧ e′) = S(h0, e) + S(h0, e′)
CA2 expresses the natural idea that score depends on and increases with
predictive performance. If a likely event occurs, then the score is high; if an
unlikely event occurs, the score is low. CA3 demands that scores on inde-
pendent pieces of evidence add up. Similar requirements and derivations
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can, for different contexts, also be found in Good (1952), Bernardo (1999)
and Williamson (2010). I leave it to future research to find explications of
degree of corroboration based on different scoring rules.
It can be demonstrated easily that CA2-CA3 leads to a logarithmic scor-
ing rule S(h0, e) = log p(e|h0), and that they uniquely determine, together
with CA1, the following measure of degree of corroboration:
Theorem 3 The only measure of corroboration that satisfies CA1-CA3 has
the form
CH(h0, e) = ∑
hi∈H
ωi log
p(e|h0)
p(e|hi) . (6)
where the logarithm has an arbitrary positive basis.
Note that even if the weights ωi sum up to infinity (e.g., in the case
of improper Bayesian priors), the degree of corroboration can be finite.
When many alternatives are hard to distinguish empirically from h0, the
log-likelihood ratio will be close to zero, and this may suffice for assigning
a finite value to CH. Standardly, however, we will assume that ∑i ωi = 1.
Our explication satisfies all four conceptual requirements that we have
advanced for degree of corroboration in Section 2: First, there is no implicit
presumption that one of the hypotheses is true, or that high degree of cor-
roboration is truth-conducive. Second, CH is independent of (an increase
in) subjective degree of belief. Third, hypotheses with zero probability
can be corroborated straightforwardly. Fourth, by means of splitting the
alternative into several individual hypotheses, CH preserves the essential
asymmetry of corroboration judgments.
Notably, the independence property CA3 of the scoring rule S(h0, e) is
preserved by CH. If two pieces of evidence e and e′ are independent under
the competing hypotheses, their degree of corroboration adds up:
CH(h0, e ∧ e′) = ∑
hi∈H
ωi log
p(e ∧ e′|h0)
p(e ∧ e′|hi)
= ∑
hi∈H
ωi log
p(e|h0) · p(e′|h0)
p(e|h1) · p(e′|hi)
= ∑
hi∈H
ωi
(
log
p(e|h0)
p(e|hi) + log
p(e′|h0)
p(e′|h1)
)
= CH(h0, e) + CH(h0, e′)
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For example, the corroboration gained in two sequential, independent ex-
periments is the sum of the individual degrees of corroboration. This
property makes CH very useful for the meta-analysis of several experi-
ments.
Of course, CH is not the only sensible measure of corroboration that
one can develop from the qualitative constraints discussed at the begin-
ning of this section. There is also an obvious objection to this measure,
namely that it is far too easy to obtain maximal, that is, infinite cor-
roboation. Whenever one of the alternatives hi is incompatible with e,
CH(h0, e) = ∞. But clearly, a hypothesis that performs poorly with respect
to most relevant alternatives should not count as maximally corroborated
just because another hypothesis happens to assign probability zero to the
observed evidence.
In response, three arguments can be advanced. First, the chosen ex-
plication of corroboration also has a definite advantage: it is easy to add
up degree of corroboration from different experiments. Testing a hypoth-
esis in many experiments naturally emerges as better than testing it in
just one experiment. Second, for the purpose of statistical testing, the
above worry is quite theoretical since the relevant probability densities are
usually strictly positive in the relevant probability space. Third, we can
modify CH in a way that resolves this problem while preserving its most
important qualitative properties.
This last suggestion will now be elaborated in detail. First, we replace
CA1 by a slightly modified condition:
CA1’ Corroboration should quantify the average score gain of replacing the
general model H with the null hypothesis h0. That is, for a suitable
scoring rule S(h0, e), the degree of corroboration that e provides for
h0 relative to H can be defined as
cH(h0, e) = ∑
hi∈H
ωi · fS(h0, hi, e) (7)
where ωi denotes the relative weight that each element of H re-
ceives (∑i ωi = 1), and fS(h0, hi, e) is a monotonous transformation
of S(h0, e)− S(hi, e).
That is, the score difference S(h0, e)− S(hi, e) may now be replaced by a
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monotonous transformation of this quantity. This keeps the basic qualita-
tive structure intact, but allows for a more intuitive scaling of degrees of
corroboration. CA2’=CA2 and CA3’=CA3 remain unchanged.
CA4’ fS(h0, h1, e) is the simplest function of the form
fS(h0, h1, e) =
∑mj=1 ∑
m
k=1 cjk p(e|h0)j p(e|h1)k
∑nj=1 ∑
n
k=1 djk p(e|h0)j p(e|h1)k
(8)
with the properties
• fS(h0, h1, e) = 0 if p(e|h0) = p(e|h1).
• fS(h0, h1, e) = 1 if p(e|h0) = 1 and p(e|h1) = 0.
• fS(h0, h1, e) = −1 if p(e|h0) = 0 and p(e|h1) = 1.
This requirement is in parts motivated by CA2 which demands that
S(h0, e) be a function of p(e|h0) only. Hence, fS(h0, h1, e) only depends
on p(e|h0) and p(e|h1). The form of the function specified in (8) is very
flexible since any function in the interval [0, 1]2 can be approximated ar-
bitrarily well by a rational function. It is therefore no substantial philo-
sophical constraint on the measure of corroboration that we choose. The
three conditions at the end of CA4 fix the neutral value of fS at zero and
the maximal/minimal values at 1 and -1, in order to obtain a balanced
aggregate score.
Theorem 4 CA1’–CA4’ jointly determine the unique function
fS(h0, h1, e) =
p(e|h0)− p(e|h1)
p(e|h0) + p(e|h1)
and the corroboration measure
C′H(h0, e) = ∑
hi∈H
ωi · p(e|h0)− p(e|hi)p(e|h0) + p(e|hi) (9)
C′H does not have the property that a logical implication e |= ¬hi leads to
an infinite corroboration value since the scores are bounded by ±1. Since
the structure of fS equals the well-studied Kemeny-Oppenheim measure
of evidential support (Kemeny and Oppenheim 1952), we can also deliver
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an intuitive interpretation for observed degrees of corroboration:
C′H(h0, e) ∈

[0; 1/4] weak corroboration
[1/4; 1/2] moderate corroboration
[1/2; 3/4] substantial corroboration
[3/4; 1] strong corroboration
Negative corroboration could then be read as evidence that under-
mines the null hypothesis: there is no predictive gain in adopting h0 as
a simplification or a proxy for the more general parametric model. Hence,
unless there is strong theoretical reason to stick to h0, we should replace it
by a different hypothesis.
I leave it to the reader to choose between CH and C′H. What counts for
the purpose of this paper is that both are sound explications of degree of
corroboration that share a lot of desirable properties. This claim will be
elaborated in the following section.
6 From corroboration back to evidential support
This section investigates the properties of our corroboration measures CH
and C′H and relates them to measures of evidential support. Crucially, it
will be shown that they satisfy the desiderata on measures of corrobora-
tion that we imposed in Section 4, at least in a modified version that is
applicable to the novel framework.
First, a general observation. Most (normalized) measures of evidential
support satisfy the constraint c(h0, e) = 0 if and only if p(e|h0) = p(e|¬h0).
This corresponds to the idea that probabilistically independent evidence
neither raises or lowers the probability of a hypothesis. However, it is not
the case that CH(h0, e) = 0 if and only if p(e|h0) = p(e|¬h0), and analo-
gously for C′H. Should this violation of a standard neutrality constraint
give us reason to worry?
I do not think so. One of the rationales behind the construction of
CH and C′H was to eliminate the idea that the alternative to h0 should
be constructed as an aggregate hypothesis ¬h0: this view is at odds with
asymmetric nature of hypothesis tests and the questions they ask. Instead,
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corroboration should describe how well a hypothesis fares with respect to
a set of alternatives. The neutrality point is then not defined as the point
where e leaves the probabilities of h0 and ¬h0 unchanged, but as the point
where evidence for and against h0 cancels out. This redefinition of evidential
neutrality is one of the main conceptual innovations with respect to the
evidential support paradigm.
All this implies that Weak Law of Likelihood cannot be formulated
consistently for measures of corroboration, since it depends on p(e|¬h0).
However, CH and C′H satisfy the stronger
Law of Likelihood (LL) For mutually exclusive hypotheses H =
{h0, h1, . . .}, H ⊂ L, e ∈ L and p(·) ∈ P and a measure of cor-
roboration cH(h, e):
cH(hi, e) >/=/< cH(hj, e) p(e|hi) >/=/< p(e|hj)
That both measures satisfy LL can be seen by the following result:
Theorem 5 For the difference in degree of corroboration between two hy-
potheses h0, h1 ∈ L, the following equalities hold:
∆CH(h0, h1, e) := CH(h0, e)− CH(h1, e) = log p(e|h0)p(e|h1)
∆C′H(h0, h1, e) := C
′
H(h0, e)− C′H(h1, e)
= (p(e|h0)− p(e|h1)) ∑
hi∈H
2ωi
p(e|hi)
(p(e|h0) + p(e|hi)) (p(e|h1) + p(e|hi))
These equations show that the ordinal relations between CH(h0, e) and
CH(h1, e) only depend on whether p(e|h0) is greater than p(e|h1). Analo-
gously for C′H. Thus, Law of Likelihood is satisfied, in agreement with
the idea that degree of corroboration is an indicator of past performance.
We also observe that adding irrelevant conjunctions h′ to h0, that is, hy-
potheses with the property p(e|h0) = p(e|h0 ∧ h′), will not affect the de-
gree of corroboration. A fortiori, both measures satisfy the Irrelevant
Conjunctions property. Actually, c(h0, e) = c(h0 ∧ h′, e) if h0 entails e may
be the only option to sail between Skylla (Popper’s VIIIc: corroboration
co-varies with prior probability) and Charybdis (irrelevant conjunctions
increase degree of corroboration).
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To evaluate the measures with regard to Screened-Off Evidence, we
have to modify the definition of that property. I suggest to rewrite
Screened-Off Evidence as follows: if e′ ⊥ e, e′ ⊥hi, and e′ ⊥ (e ∧ hi) for
all hi ∈ H, then CH(h0, e ∧ e′) = CH(h0, e). This is a natural generaliza-
tion from two competing hypotheses (h0 and ¬h0) to a larger set H whose
members hi may denote different values of a parameter of interest. It is
then easy to observe that both CH and C′H satisfy Screened-Off Evidence
since they only depend on the likelihoods of the hypothesis on the evi-
dence.
We also gain a nuanced and interesting picture of the sensitivity of
corroboration to the prior standing of the corroborated hypothesis. For
our measure of corroboration, we can isolate the prior weight of h0, ω0,
from the relations of the other weights to each other:
C′H(h0, e) = (1−ω0) · ∑
hi∈H\{h0}
ωi
1−ω0 fS(h0, h1, e) (10)
since the summand containing h0 vanishes anyway. (We obtain the same
calculations for CH by letting fS(h0, h1, e) = log(p(e|h0)/p(e|h1)).) Since
ω0 = 1−∑i 6=0 ωi, the factors ωi/(1−ω0) only depend on the ratios of the
ωi to each other. Hence, equation (10) can be read as “degree of corrob-
oration of h0 = improbability of h0× average predictive gain by adopting
h0”. Together with the rescaling ω′i := ωi/(1− ω0), this simple operation
allows us to partially derive C′H with respect to ω0:
∂C′H(h0, e)
dω0
= − ∑
hi∈H\{h0}
ω′i fS(h0, h1, e),
since f (S(h0, e)− S(h1, e)) is by construction independent of the ωi. It then
transpires that CH and C′H decrease in ω0, that is, they increase with the
improbability of h0. This is because the term on the right side of (6) has the
same sign as CH and C′H.
Popper proposed that informativity, testability and empirical con-
tent, as measured by the improbability of a hypothesis, are always
corroboration-conducive factors. For our measures, this depends on
whether or not cH(h0, e) > 0. For a positively corroborated hypothe-
sis, a low weight is indeed beneficial because the average gain in pre-
dictive score vis-à-vis the alternatives is bigger than for a hypothesis that
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already had a high weight beforehand. This shows that CH and C′H sat-
isfy (Strong/Weak) Informativity, the desiderata that were distinctive
for corroboration as opposed to evidential support. For a negative degree
of corroboration, the same reasoning amplifies the “degree of refutation”
of h0. Thus, we can recover and refine the Popperian picture at the same
time.
Finally, some remarks on the relationship between corroboration and
evidential support. One of the most popular explications of weight of
evidence, the degree to which e favors h0 over h1, is the aforementioned
(log-)likelihood ratio log(p(e|h0)/p(e|h1)) which is supported by a wide
range of theoretical and empirical arguments (Good 1983/2009; Royall
1997; Lele 2004; Sober 2008). Theorem 5 has shown that for CH, the
weight of evidence in favor of h0 is its excess degree of corroboration over
h1. That is, ∆CH(h0, h1, e) = log(p(e|h0)/p(e|h1)). A similar relation holds
for C′H. This suggests that (contrastive) evidential support can also be de-
rived from corroboration judgments and performance differences. Sym-
metries in evidential support such as c(h0, e) = −c(¬h0, e) then naturally
emerge as a consequence of symmetries in corroboration differences, such
as ∆CH(h0, h1, e) = −∆CH(h1, h0, e).
Actually, l(h, e) is not the only measure of evidential support for which
such a relation can be established. For the log-ratio measure r(h, e) =
p(e|h)/p(e) defended by Milne (1996), we obtain
CH(h0, e) = ∑
hi∈H
ωi log
(
p(e|h0)
p(e)
· p(e)
p(e|hi)
)
= log
p(e|h0)
p(e)
− ∑
hi∈H
ωi log
p(e|hi)
p(e)
= r(h0, e)− ∑
hi∈H
ωi r(hi, e)
which we can interpret as the difference between the support for h0 and
the average support for all hypotheses in H—an observation that I owe
to Wayne Myrvold. Dependent on the preferred explication of evidential
support, we can either express corroboration in terms of support differ-
ences or derive contrastive evidential support from differences in degree
of corroboration. All this suggests that corroboration and evidential sup-
port are tightly related concepts in inductive inference. How both concepts
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interact precisely is an exciting issue for further research.
7 Summary and discussion
The concept of degree of corroboration defines how the failure to reject a
hypothesis affects its epistemic status. In other words, explicating corrobo-
ration helps to positively appraise a hypothesis that has survived a severe
test. The failure to adequately formalize this concept has been a long-
standing lacuna in statistics, science and philosophy: standard statistical
procedures such as null hypothesis significance tests (NHSTs) are silent
on non-significant results, and the critical rationalist research program in
philosophy of science lacks a quantitative dimension—especially if com-
pared to the rich Bayesian theory of evidential support. This contribution
shows what a formalization of corroboration could look like, and how it
fruitfully complements the Bayesian perspective on inductive inference.
In the first place, this contribution motivates why corroboration judg-
ments cannot be replaced by judgments of evidential support, and why
corroboration and support play complementary roles. Based on this char-
acterization in Sections 1 and 2, I investigate Popper’s attempt to explicate
this concept in terms of probabilistic relevance. After debunking Popper’s
own explication, I show that positive probabilistic relevance is a problem-
atic framework for explicating degree of corroboration. This argument
culminates in two impossibility results which show that no measure of
corroboration can jointly satisfy several plausible adequacy criteria.
Motivated by these findings, I develop a constructive account of de-
gree of corroboration, which is neutral with respect to the methodological
divide between various schools of inductive inference (e.g., Bayesians and
frequentists). The model is based on the idea that corroboration is, unlike
evidential support, assessed with respect to a partition of alternatives to the
tested hypothesis h0, rather than by comparing h0 to its negation ¬h0. In
my explication, degree of corroboration compares the average predictive
score difference between h0 and the alternatives to h0, with respect to ev-
idence e. The idea is that a high degree of corroboration entitles us to
replace a general model H with a precise hypothesis h0 without incurring
too many losses. This fits actually well with Popper’s idea that corrobora-
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tion serves for determining pragmatic preferences over different scientific
hypotheses, but does not ground any confidence in their truth.
The chosen explication is shown to have several desirable properties:
for instance, it allows for the corroboration of hypotheses with zero prob-
ability (a standard problem for the Bayesian), it shows how the informa-
tivity of a hypothesis contributes to its corroborability, how irrelevant ev-
idence leaves degree of corroboration unchanged, etc. Moreover, corrob-
oration differences between two hypotheses turn out to be closely related
to contrastive evidential support.
All in all, this paper does not only explicate a concept that has unjusti-
fiably fallen into oblivion: it also improves the assessment of the results of
statistical hypothesis tests, and it shows how evidential support and de-
gree of corroboration can be complementary notions in the assessment of
scientific theories. Future work will explore other axiomatic characteriza-
tions for measures of corroboration, expand on their application to statis-
tical tesing and explore the quantitative (dis)agreements between corrobo-
ration and Bayesian measures of evidence (e.g., the Bayes factor). For now,
I conclude that our formalizations of corroboration lay the foundations
for a new logic of statistical hypothesis testing (and NHST in particular),
beyond the Bayesian/frequentist divide.
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A Proofs of the theorems
Proof of Theorem 1: By Weak Informativity, there are x, y, z > z′ with
z + z′ < 1:
f (x, y, z) ≤ f (x, y, z′).
Choose a probability function p(·) such that p(h1) = z, p(h2) = z′, p(h1 ∧
h2) = 0, p(e|h1) = p(e|h2) = x, p(e) = y. This is always possible because
it was assumed that z + z′ < 1. Then it is straightforward to show that
p(e|¬h1) = 11− p(h1) [p(e|h1)p(h2) + p(e|¬h1¬h2)p(¬h1¬h2)]
p(e|¬h2) = 11− p(h2) [p(e|h1)p(h1) + p(e|¬h1¬h2)p(¬h1¬h2)]
From this we can infer
p(e|¬h1)− p(e|¬h2)
= p(e|h1)
[
p(h2)
1− p(h1) −
p(h1)
1− p(h2)
]
+ p(e|¬h1¬h2)(1− p(h1)− p(h2))
·
[
1
1− p(h1) −
1
1− p(h2)
]
= p(e|h1) p(h2)− p(h2)
2 − p(h1) + p(h1)2
(1− p(h1)) (1− p(h2)) + (1− p(h1)− p(h2))
· p(e|¬h1¬h2) · (p(h1)− p(h2))
(1− p(h1)) (1− p(h2))
= p(e|h1) (p(h1)− p(h2)) · (p(h1) + p(h2)− 1)(1− p(h1)) (1− p(h2)) + (1− p(h1)− p(h2))
· p(e|¬h1¬h2) · (p(h1)− p(h2))
(1− p(h1)) (1− p(h2))
=
1
(1− p(h1)) (1− p(h2)) (p(h1)− p(h2)) · (p(h1) + p(h2)− 1) · (p(e|h1)− p(e|¬h1¬h2))
< 0
because e was assumed to be positively relevant to h1 and h2, and because
the prior of h1 exceeds the prior of h2. Hence, the conditions for applying
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Weak Law of Likelihood are satisfied:
f (x, y, z) = c(h1, e) > c(h2, e) = f (x, y, z′)
in contradiction with the inequality f (x, y, z) ≤ f (x, y, z′) that we got from
Weak Informativity. 
Proof of Theorem 2: Let us assume that the conditions of
Screened-Off Evidence are satisfied:
p(e2h) = p(e2)p(h)
p(e1e2) = p(e2)p(e1)
p(e1e2|h) = p(e2)p(e1|h)
By setting a := p(e2), x := p(e1|h), y = p(e1) and z = p(h), we can then
derive the general equality
f (ax, ay, z) = c(h, e1e2) = c(h, e1) = f (x, y, z) (11)
where Screened-Off Evidence has been used in the middle equality.
Now we observe that by Strong Informativity, there are x > y and
z > z′ such that
f (x, y, z) < f (x, y, z′).
By an application of (11), we then obtain
f (1, y/x, z) < f (1, y/x, z′). (12)
Now choose a probability function p(·) such that for sentences h, e, h′ ∈ L
that satisfy the conditions of Irrelevant Conjunctions, p(h) = z, p(h ∧
h′) = z′, p(e) = y/x. This implies
f (1, y/x, z) ≥ f (1, y/x, z′),
since c(h, e) ≥ c(h ∧ h′, e), but it contradicts (12). Hence, the theorem is
proven. 
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Proof of Theorem 3: Let e ⊥ e′|h0. From CA2 it follows that S(h0, e ∧
e′) = f (p(e|h0) · p(e′|h0)), and from CA3 it follows that S(h0, e ∧ e′) =
S(h0, e) + S(h0, e′) = f (p(e|h0)) + f (p(e′|h0)). This leads to the require-
ment
f (p(e|h0) · p(e′|h0)) = f (p(e|h0)) + f (p(e′|h0))
which is only satisfied by the logarithmic scoring rule S(h0, e) =
loga p(e|h0), for all a ≥ 0. To see that this uniqueness property holds, re-
member that the exponential functions are the only continuous functions
with the property g(x + y) = g(x) · g(y). They define an isomorphism be-
tween the additive group of real numbers and the multiplicative group of
postive reals. They are the only functions who do so, and the logarithms
are their inverse.
If there were another continuous function f with the property f (xy) =
f (x) + f (y), it could not be surjective because in that case, it would have
to be a logarithm. Hence, f is not surjective and therefore also bounded
(because of continuity). Then adding further summands shows that such
a construction cannot work: f (x0 · x1 · x2 · . . .) = f (x0) + f (x1) + f (x2) +
. . . This shows that f can be raised to an arbitrary value, contradicting
boundedness. Hence S(h0, e) = log p(e|h0).
The rest of the proof is straightforward. By CA1 and the above, we
obtain
CH(h0, e) = ∑
hi∈H
ωi · (S(h0, e)− S(hi, e))
= ∑
hi∈H
ωi · (log p(e|h0)− log p(e|hi))
= ∑
hi∈H
ωi · log p(e|h0)p(e|hi)

Proof of Theorem 4: As before, CA2’-CA3’ determine that S(h0, e) =
log p(e|h0). We will now prove the theorem by considering different forms
of fS in increasing complexity and demonstrate that the form stated in
Theorem 4 is indeed the simplest one.
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Assume first that m = 0 and n = 1. In that case, the neutrality condi-
tion fS(h0, h1, e) = 0 if p(e|h0) = p(e|h1) cannot be satisfied unless c00 = 0
because the numerator is a constant. Hence, we can neglect this possibility.
Now assume that m = 1 and n = 0. Here, the neutrality condition
fS(h0, h1, e) = 0 if p(e|h0) = p(e|h1) leads to the equation
c00 + (c10 + c01)p(e|h0) + c11 p(e|h0)2 = 0 (13)
which is satisfied in general if and only if c00 = c11 = 0 and c10 = −c01.
Clearly, the resulting function f (h0, h1, e) = p(e|h0)− p(e|h1) is not ordi-
nally equivalent to S(h0, e)− S(h1, e) = log p(e|h0)− log p(e|h1), regardless
of the value of c10 and the base of the logarithm. Hence, we can neglect
this possibility, too.
Now assume that m = n = 1. Again, the neutrality condition leads to
the conclusion c00 = c11 = 0 and c10 = −c01. Now, let us set p(e|h0) = 1,
p(e|h1) = 0, and vice versa. Then, the maximality constraint implies d10 =
d01 = 1 and the simplest function that maintains ordinal equivalence with
S(h0, e)− S(h1e), as demanded by CA1’, is obtained by setting d00 = d11 =
0. 
Proof of Theorem 5: For CH, the calculation is straightforward:
∆CH(h0, h1, e) = CH(h0, e)− CH(h1, e)
= ∑
hi∈H
ωi log
p(e|h0)
p(e|hi) − ∑hi∈H
ωi log
p(e|h1)
p(e|hi)
= ∑
hi∈H
ωi log
(
p(e|h0)
p(e|hi) ·
p(e|hi)
p(e|h1)
)
=
(
∑
hi∈H
ωi
)
log
p(e|h0)
p(e|h1)
= log
p(e|h0)
p(e|h1)
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For C′H, we have to work a bit harder:
C′H(h0, e)− C′H(h1, e)
= ∑
hi∈H
ωi
p(e|h0)− p(e|hi)
p(e|h0) + p(e|hi) − ∑hi∈H
ωi
p(e|h1)− p(e|hi)
p(e|h1) + p(e|hi)
= (ω0 +ω1)
p(e|h0)− p(e|h1)
p(e|h0) + p(e|h1) + ∑hi∈H\{h0,h1}
ωi
· (p(e|h0)− p(e|hi)) (p(e|h1) + p(e|hi))− (p(e|h0) + p(e|hi)) (p(e|h1)− p(e|hi))
(p(e|h0) + p(e|hi)) (p(e|h1) + p(e|hi))
= (ω0 +ω1)
p(e|h0)− p(e|h1)
p(e|h0) + p(e|h1) + ∑hi∈H\{h0,h1}
2ωi
p(e|h0)p(e|hi)− p(e|h1)p(e|hi)
(p(e|h0) + p(e|hi)) (p(e|h1) + p(e|hi))
= (p(e|h0)− p(e|h1))
[
ω0 +ω1
p(e|h0) + p(e|h1) + ∑hi∈H\{h0,h1}
2ωi p(e|hi)
(p(e|h0) + p(e|hi)) (p(e|h1) + p(e|hi))
]
= (p(e|h0)− p(e|h1)) ∑
hi∈H
2ωi
p(e|hi)
(p(e|h0) + p(e|hi)) (p(e|h1) + p(e|hi))

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